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1 Introduction
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union (EU) is one of the schemes
by which, in the world trading system, developed countries offer “special and differential treat-
ment” to developing countries, in the form of non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs). These
preferences schemes have been established since the early 1970s and are founded on the idea of
granting non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferential market access to developing coun-
tries, with the objective of increasing their export earnings, promoting their industrialization
and accelerating their rates of economic growth (UNCTAD, 1968).1 Currently there are 27
NRTPs schemes in force (Ornelas and Ritel, 2020) which are often available to all developing
countries (i.e. the GSPs), although some schemes are limited to countries from a specific region,
or else feature more preferential sub-schemes reserved for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
NRTPs schemes have been found to affect positively exports of developing countries, espe-
cially in studies focusing on a single scheme and exploiting detailed product-level data (Frazer
and Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Thelle et al., 2015).2 However, a potentially important downside
of NRTPs schemes is the uncertainty that accompanies the preferences. The non-reciprocal
nature of the preferences confers some discretion to the donors in determining both country and
product eligibility to the schemes, as well as the power to revoke the schemes altogether (Gross-
man and Sykes, 2005); NRTPs schemes have limited duration, can expire and/or need periodic
renewal (Hakobyan, 2017b); and some schemes feature mechanisms for preference removal from
competitive countries or sectors (Hakobyan, 2017a).
All these aspects render the benefits of NRTPs uncertain, which in turn is likely to under-
mine their main purpose: to stimulate exports from the beneficiary countries. Exporters might
1Resolution 21(II) on “Preferential or Free Entry of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of
Developing Countries to the Developed Countries”, UNCTAD meeting 1968.
2Studies exploiting bilateral country-level data and searching for an aggregate effect of NRTPs schemes have
come up with both negative (Eicher and Henn, 2011; Herz and Wagner, 2011) and positive findings (Gil-Pareja et
al., 2014; Ornelas and Ritel, 2020; Tobin and Busch, 2019). Both Ornelas & Ritel and Tobin & Busch, however,
find that WTO membership interacts with NRTPs: the first study shows that the positive NRTPs impact on
exports vanishes with WTO membership, due to low preferences margins in WTO context; the latter study finds
that WTO membership reduces imports of beneficiaries. See (Ornelas, 2016) for a comprehensive review on the
studies on the impact of NRTPs.
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be induced to under-invest in products eligible for preferences schemes, or in products which
satisfy the Rules of Origin requirements (Limão, 2016), thereby leading to under-utilization of
preferences. In spite of these important shortcomings of NRTPs schemes, there is, to the best
of our knowledge, no work that investigates the trade effects of uncertainty related to NRTPs.
Our paper intends to fill this gap in the literature.
We use the 2014 reform of the EU’s GSP scheme to identify the impact of removing (NRTPs)
uncertainty on trade by beneficiary countries. The aspect of the reform that we focus on is a
decrease in uncertainty for GSP+ countries (a subset of all GSP beneficiaries), resulting from the
elimination of the possibility to lose trade preferences in case they become “too competitive.”
In other words, with the reform GSP+ countries obtain the certainty of their preferential access
to the EU, regardless of whether their exports to the EU grow beyond a certain limit. We
isolate this change in uncertainty from other modifications to the GSP scheme introduced by the
reform and find that EU imports from GSP+ countries increased in a robust and economically
important way. Furthermore, the reform did not lead to a re-direction of trade from alternative
destinations but instead to a genuine increase in exporting activity towards the EU.
This paper adds both to the aforementioned literature on trade effects of NRTPs as well as
to a fast growing strand of literature on the effects of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) (Handley,
2014; Handley and Limao, 2015; Handley and Limão, 2017; Crowley et al., 2018a,b; Carballo
et al., 2018; Graziano et al., 2018). Handley (2014) and Handley and Limao (2015) develop
heterogeneous firm models of export entry under TPU and apply them to the context of the
reduction in tariff overhangs in Australia (gap between bound and applied tariffs) and the EU
accession of Portugal, showing that in both cases the reduction in TPU explained a large fraction
of the increase in exporters’ entry that followed these events. Handley and Limão (2017) extend
their 2015 model to allow also for technology upgrading investments by incumbent exporters,
and show that the elimination of TPU that followed China’s WTO entry explains about 30%
of the increase of Chinese exports to the US post-accession. Crowley et al. (2018a) examine
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the negative impact of an increase in TPU generated by tariff-echoing3 on the likelihood of
entry into exporting by Chinese firms, whereas Carballo et al. (2018) find that, in the 2008-09
crisis, the increase in TPU determined a stronger reduction of US exports to markets with which
the US did not have a preferential trade agreement (PTA), relative to PTA markets. Also the
impact of Brexit has been exploited to investigate the effects of a change in TPU: Crowley et
al. (2018b) show that the switch to a renegotiation regime between the UK and the EU led to
a reduction of entry of UK exporters into the EU market; Graziano et al. (2018) use instead
the uncertainty of the political process pre-Brexit referendum and find that greater uncertainty
corresponded to reduced trading activity between the EU and the UK.
This paper adds to the TPU literature by examining the trade effects of a different source
of uncertainty, namely the uncertainty created by the graduation rules in the EU’s GSP scheme.
It is the first work that examines empirically the trade effects for developing countries of a
reduction in TPU related to NRTPs.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 The EU’s GSP Scheme
The EU’s GSP was established in 1971 and, over the past four decades, has been reformed
considerably, with the stated goal of rendering trade preferences more predictable, certain and
limited to those countries most in need. Currently, the EU’s GSP features three sub-schemes,
with increasing stability of preferences and level of market access in the EU: the standard GSP,
the GSP+ and the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative.
The standard GSP grants lower than MFN or zero import duties on about 66% of the
tariff lines applied by the EU, defined at the CN-8 digit product level, to a list of fourteen
3The increase in the probability of the application of an anti-dumping duty, following the application of such
a duty in a neighbouring country.
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beneficiaries4 falling into the categories of low and lower-middle income countries.5
The GSP+ extends this preferential treatment, allowing duty free imports of all the products
covered by the standard GSP.6 Membership to the GSP+ is reserved to GSP members which
the EU considers economically vulnerable7, and is conditional on the ratification of a list of 27
international conventions on sustainable development and good governance. Currently there are
eight GSP+ members.8 Finally, the EBA initiative grants the most preferential treatment, as it
allows duty-free imports of all products shipped by the group of 48 Least Developed Countries
(LDCs)9, except arms and ammunition.
The preferential treatment offered by the EU across the three GSP sub-schemes differs
not only in terms of product coverage and preference margins, but also in terms of stability
of preferences. Since 1995, the EU has been withdrawing preferences from those countries and
sectors which are no longer considered in need of a preferential treatment, through the mechanism
of graduation. This exclusion mechanism has undergone various modifications since it was first
introduced. In its current form, introduced in 2005 (European Union, 2005), graduation works
both at the country and the sector level, respectively, with important differences across standard
GSP, GSP+ and the EBA initiative.
A beneficiary that is classified as a high- or an upper-middle income country by the Word
Bank for three consecutive years, or enters into an alternative trade agreement with the EU
granting similar or better than GSP preferences, leaves the GSP entirely, through country grad-
4This is the number of beneficiaries as of the time of writing. The membership base has changed considerably
over time and is now at its lowest since the launch of the programme. Tables with members of the Standard GSP,
GSP+ and EBA initiative are in Appendix, where we make a distinction between the current membership base,
and the one used in the analysis (2009-2016).
5This income categories are based on the Word Bank classification.
6The share of tariff lines eligible for the duty-free GSP+ treatment is virtually the same as that for standard
GSP (66%), with the difference that about 50% of standard GSP tariffs, although lower than MFN, do not go to
zero (Ornelas, 2016). The tariff lines eligible for stardard GSP or GSP+ treatment are among those on which the
EU applies a positive MFN tariff.
7Vulnerability is expressed in terms of a country’s size, i.e. the country’s share of total EU GSP imports being
less than 6.5%, and concentration of the export portfolio, i.e. the share of the seven largest sectors in total EU
GSP imports from that country being larger than 75% (European Union, 2015)
8Paraguay left the GSP+ scheme in 2019, but given the time span under investigation in this paper, we will
include this country in the analysis.
9The identification of LDCs follows the long-standing UN definition, which is based on the three main criteria
of income, human assets and economic vulnerability. The group of LDCs has been very stable over time, with
the last country to leave the group being Samoa, in 2019.
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uation. This income-related graduation can happen at any point in time and can affect any type
of GSP member.
Trade competitiveness in a certain product section10, measured as a country’s share of EU
imports under GSP in that section, can instead lead to country-section graduation: preferences
are removed from a beneficiary in a section if its import-share exceeds a certain threshold. This
graduation import-share threshold was initially set at 15% (12.5% for textiles) but, because the
share is computed out of GSP eligible imports, the threshold is revised upwards when some
beneficiaries leave the scheme.11 The threshold was increased to 17.5% (14.5% for textiles) in
2014, due to the membership restriction imposed by the 2014 GSP reform, and to 57% (47.5%
for textiles and 17.5% for minerals, live plants, animal and vegetable oils) in 2015 following some
income-related graduations, among which that of China.
These competitiveness-related graduations are evaluated at three year intervals; i.e. every
three years the EU computes the import-shares of all country-section pairs eligible for GSP
preferences and then decides about the graduations that will apply for the next three years.
Importantly, the existence of a graduation threshold in the form of an import-share generates
uncertainty. A country in receipt of GSP preferences in a section is at risk of losing them, every
three years, if either its exports to the EU in that section increase, or other countries’ exports
to the EU in that section decrease. Further, the closer a country-section’s import share is to the
threshold, the higher the likelihood of losing preferential status upon exceeding the threshold.
Standard GSP preferences are currently the least certain out of the three sub-schemes, be-
cause they can be lost through both country- and country-section graduations. Conversely, EBA
members have benefited from the most stable preferences since the creation of this programme
in 2001 (European Union, 2001), as they were never exposed to the threat of a competitiveness-
10Product sections are the sectors in which the EU divided the products eligible for GSP preferences, for
purposes of preferences removal. As of 2014, there are 32 sections, based on the 21 sections of the Harmonised
System (HS) classification.
11This is done to avoid that the remaining beneficiaries would mechanically graduate because of the reduction
of the total out of which the shares are calculated.
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related (country-section) graduation but only to income-related (country) graduations.12
2.2 The 2014 GSP Reform
In this ranking of “preference-security”, GSP+ economies lie in between the standard GSP and
the EBA initative. Importantly, GSP+ members underwent a change in regime over time: they
were at risk of having their preferences removed under both country and country-section gradu-
ations from 2006 to 2014; then, the GSP reform of 2014 removed the threat of competitiveness-
related (country-section) graduations (European Union, 2012). GSP+ members, therefore, ex-
perienced a change in uncertainty related to their preferential market access in the EU, as since
2014 they are no longer subject to the threat of graduating in case their competitiveness grows
beyond the established import-share thresholds.13 This change in uncertainty is at the core of
the empirical analysis performed in this paper.
We find that the 2014 GSP reform led to an increase in EU imports of GSP+ products
from GSP+ countries by 47%, on average. To assess whether this trade effect is due to lower
preference uncertainty, we exploit various aspects of the reform.
First, we take into account that Pakistan, the Philippines and Kyrgyzstan moved from the
standard GSP to the GSP+ over the years affected by reform, implying that these countries
benefited both from the removal of uncertainty and lower tariffs in the EU, respectively. We
isolate the uncertainty effect from that of lower tariffs by either controlling for the applied tariff
rate, or by obtaining separate estimates for products whose tariffs changed and products whose
tariffs did not change at the time of the reform. When conditioning on the applied tariff we find
that, on average, EU imports from GSP+ countries increased by 45%; when splitting the effect
12Note also that only a handful of countries left the group of LDCs/EBA members over the years, with even
fewer actually undergoing an income-related graduation. The Maldives and Samoa are the only two countries
graduating both from the group of LDCs, in 2011 and 2014, respectively, and from GSP in 2015 and 2019,
respectively.
13GSP+ countries can experience a temporary or permanent removal of their preferences also because of
violations in the implementation of the list of international conventions they had to ratify to access GSP+. So far
this happened only once, for Sri Lanka, between 2010 and 2017, which during those years fell back to the standard
GSP membership. Violation of the international conventions in the GSP+ list can, however, lead also to standard
GSP and EBA preferences removal. There is, therefore, no differential treatment across GSP sub-schemes as far
as this aspect is concerned, which was also not affected by the 2014 reform.
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of the reform we find that EU imports increased by 36% for products whose tariffs remained
unchanged, and by 96% for products which benefited from both the reduction in uncertainty
and lower tariffs.
Second, the removal of the graduation threshold should be of higher relevance for country-
section pairs exposed to the graduation threat, i.e. those with import-shares close to the pre-
reform (15%) threshold. To explore this rationale we use each country-section’s import-share
and compute the distance from the threshold. However, as the distribution of country-section
pairs over the distance distribution is extremely skewed14 rather than relying on a continuous
distance measure, we divide the distance in two equal 7.5 percentage points bins and find that
the impact of the reform is about 72% (or 34 percentage points) higher on products in sectors
in the first bin, relative to the remaining part of the distribution.
Third, other than altering the graduation mechanism for GSP+ countries, the 2014 GSP
reform also amended other aspects of the scheme. The overall aim of the reform was to re-
focus the EU’s GSP, to make preferences more certain and meaningful for the countries most
in need (UNCTAD, 2015). To achieve this, for the first time the scheme was renewed for a
period of 10 years, in contrast with the three-year extensions applied thus far in the past.15 In
addition, the membership base of the GSP was drastically reduced: all upper-middle income
countries, together with the overseas territories under the administration of developed countries,
and countries with alternative preferential trade agreements with the EU, were stripped of their
GSP membership. GSP beneficiaries were thus restricted to low and lower-middle income coun-
tries16 and the overall number of beneficiaries was more than halved, from 177 to 88 (European
Union, 2012).17 This large change in the number of beneficiaries could have implied a change in
14There are only 14% of the ”treated” observations in the first 10 percentage points away from the 15%
threshold
15This is also in sharp contrast with GSP schemes of other donors, e.g. the US scheme needs to be renewed
every year (Hakobyan, 2017b)
16This income-based definition includes all LDCs, which remained GSP beneficiaries under the EBA scheme.
17The restriction in the membership basis implied that, to maintain proportionality of preferential treatment
for the countries which remained in the scheme, the graduation threshold was raised from 15% to 17.5% (from
12.5% to 15.5% for textiles). In the reform, the EU also changed the classification of products into sections,
which are used for graduation calculations: the number of sections was increased from 21 to 32, with some of the
previous sections divided into two or three sub-sections. We take all these changes to the scheme into account in
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competition in the EU market in favour of GSP+ countries, and stimulated their exports to the
EU. To mitigate concerns that the estimated increase in trade for GSP+ countries post-GSP
reform was due to this more favourable competitive position rather than to lower uncertainty, we
re-estimate the effect of the reform by retaining in the estimation sample only the GSP sections
in which countries staying in GSP accounted for at least 75% of EU GSP imports pre-reform.18
This implies a substantial change in sample size, as the number of GSP sections used in estima-
tion is reduced from 32 to 13. All results are upheld in the reduced sample, with minor changes
in the magnitude of the estimated effects, thus allowing us to attribute the bulk of the change
in trade to the reduction in preference uncertainty.
Finally, we explore the nature of the trade increase caused by the GSP reform and find that
GSP+ countries appear to have taken advantage of better (and more secure) trade preferences
to EU markets by increasing their overall exporting activity, rather than simply re-directing
their exports from alternative destinations.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.5 describes the data and
section 3 provides some descriptive evidence about the relevance of the GSP scheme for its
beneficiaries and the threat represented by the graduation mechanism. Section 4 exposes the
empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the results, section 6 explores whether GSP+ countries
re-directed their trade to the EU from alternative export destinations, and section 7 concludes.
3 Relevance of the EU’s GSP and the graduations
The share of EU imports that originates from GSP beneficiaries is substantial. For instance, as
Table 1 shows, GSP beneficiaries accounted for over 57% of EU imports in 2009. The largest
fraction came from standard GSP members whereas members of trade agreements accounted
for nearly 16% of EU imports, and trade partners without any agreement with the EU made up
the remaining 27%.
our empirical exercises.
18Alternatively, we excluded sectors where exiters’ import-share is larger than 25%.
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2009 0.157 0.533 0.023 0.017 0.271
2010 0.146 0.562 0.020 0.015 0.257
2011 0.172 0.568 0.023 0.019 0.219
2012 0.175 0.572 0.022 0.019 0.211
2013 0.179 0.563 0.023 0.022 0.212
2014 0.240 0.303 0.012 0.024 0.421
2015 0.242 0.094 0.014 0.024 0.626
2016 0.266 0.082 0.009 0.022 0.619
Source: Authors’ calculation on COMEXT data.
The 2014 GSP reform changed the relative contribution of these subgroups to EU imports
quite drastically. GSP beneficiaries’ share decreased to 34% in 2014 and further to 13% in 2015,
after the exit of China from the scheme. Within GSP beneficiaries, the shares of both standard
GSP and GSP+ countries fell, the former mostly due to GSP exclusions determined by the
reform, the latter due to the signing of FTAs between the EU on one hand, and the Central
American Region and the countries of the Andean Community, respectively, on the other hand.
Note also that the share of imports from countries without any agreement nearly tripled, this
being due to GSP membership exclusions, most notably that of China.
Table 2 adopts the GSP beneficiaries’ point of view and examines the salience of preferential
market access for those exporters. Over the 2009-2013 period, approximately 35% of EU imports
from standard GSP members is in products eligible for this scheme. The value share of eligible
products increased to about 50% in 2014 but fell again afterwards. Imports from GSP+ countries
also showed an increase in the share of GSP eligible products in the year of the GSP reform and
this hike is even more pronounced: pre-reform about 15% of EU imports from GSP+ countries
were eligible for GSP, increasing to over 50% in 2014. This change in the composition of trade
between the EU and GSP countries is mostly due to changes in GSP membership (e.g. for GSP+,
entry of Pakistan and exit of Central American and Andean countries), and it demonstrates the
relevance of the scheme for its beneficiaries.
Table 2 also offers insights into the quantitatively important threat represented by country-
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section graduations. In the period up to the 2014 reform, both standard GSP and GSP+
members were subject to the risk of competitiveness-related preferences removals, although
in practice only standard GSP countries were affected by them. The graduations, however,
concern a large fraction of trade eligible for GSP preferences: for instance, in 2009 21% of EU
imports from standard GSP countries were from country-section pairs which had lost preferential
status. This accounted for approximately 55% (21/38) of the GSP eligible imports from these
countries.19 The share of graduated imports increased abruptly in 2014, with the new wave
of graduations arising from the reform, and then fell similarly abruptly the following year,
when China left the scheme. Due to its size, China was by far the country most affected by
competitiveness related graduations.
Table 2: Relevance of the GSP and the graduations for GSP beneficiaries
Standard GSP GSP+ EBA
Not eligible Eligible Not eligible Eligible Not eligible Eligible
Graduated Not graduated
Of which at risk Of which at risk
2009 0.63 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.75 0.25 0.16 0.49 0.51
2010 0.64 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.78 0.22 0.13 0.46 0.54
2011 0.65 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.86 0.14 0.08 0.51 0.49
2012 0.67 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.86 0.14 0.08 0.49 0.51
2013 0.65 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.85 0.15 0.09 0.50 0.50
2014 0.49 0.39 0.12 0.47 0.53 0.46 0.54
2015 0.60 0.06 0.34 0.44 0.56 0.36 0.64
2016 0.54 0.08 0.38 0.38 0.62 0.27 0.73
Source: Authors’ calculation on COMEXT and TRAINS data.
In order to provide an indication of the overall threat represented by this mechanism, we
also report the share of trade that we consider to be “at risk” of graduating. These figures
are constructed by computing the distance between the actual country-section’s import-share
and the threshold, respectively, and considering the top ten percent (i.e. the first decile of this
distribution) to be at risk of graduating.20 The figures in the columns labelled “of which at
19Note that share of imports graduated from GSP - e.g. the 21% in 2009 - is due to country-sections which
remain graduated over the 2009-2013 period, hence the similarity of these import shares in the 2009-2013 years.
20We compute the distance from the threshold applying the pre-2014 reform rules, i.e. pre-reform membership,
product-sections and graduation threshold. For this reason we only compute the distance, and the share of trade
at risk of graduating, for the pre-2014 reform period. Standard GSP countries face country-section graduations
also post-2014, but the column ”of which at risk” is discontinued for consistency with the column for GSP+
countries.
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risk” in Table 2 have the following meaning: in 2009, out of the 17% of EU imports from
standard GSP countries that had not yet been graduated, 12% (or, 12/17= 70% of it) consists
of trade in country-sections in the first decile of the distance distribution. Similar shares are
found for GSP+ countries. These figures are large21 and show that country-section graduations
represented a serious threat for the majority of trade eligible for GSP preferences.
Table 3: Utilization rates by GSP sub-schemes
Standard GSP GSP+ EBA
Out of non
graduated
2009 0.215 0.486 0.828 0.664
2010 0.225 0.502 0.848 0.658
2011 0.245 0.519 0.904 0.786
2012 0.245 0.523 0.871 0.821
2013 0.243 0.522 0.792 0.828
2014 0.150 0.640 0.695 0.858
2015 0.525 0.623 0.593 0.921
2016 0.528 0.635 0.806 0.906
Source: Authors’ calculation on COMEXT and TRAINS data.
Preferences utilization rates can further reinforce our understanding of the relevance of both
GSP preferences and of the risk represented by graduations, as they can indicate the severity
of the loss that preference removal can impose on GSP beneficiaries. Table 3 shows utilization
rates (i.e. the share of EU imports on which a preferential GSP duty is used, out of GSP eligible
imports) for the three subgroups of beneficiaries; for standard GSP countries we also compute
the utilization rate out of the fraction of EU GSP eligible imports not subject to graduation.
GSP+ countries have the highest utilization rates over the first half of the period under analysis,
while in the second half the highest utilization rates are found for EBA countries. Standard GSP
countries exhibit relatively lower utilization rates, but the figures computed out of non-graduated
sections reveal that preferential duties were claimed and applied on at least 50% of imports from
these countries.
Taken together, the descriptive figures in Tables 1-3 imply that the EU’s GSP scheme is
21Since the shares of trade ”at risk of graduating” are computed out of EU imports eligible for GSP and not
yet graduated, China is excluded from most of the numerators and the denominators - having already graduated
in most sections in the past.
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of high relevance for its beneficiaries, and that country-section graduations represent a serious
threat in terms of the value of trade that is subject to, or at risk of, preference removal.
4 Empirical strategy
We estimate the effect of a particular aspect of the 2014 reform of EU’s GSP scheme. Since
2014, GSP+ beneficiaries are no longer subject to the threat of losing their tariff preferences
in case their EU imports in certain product sections grow beyond the graduation threshold.
The reform removed a crucial source of uncertainty surrounding GSP+ preferences, related to
competitiveness, which we expect could have prompted GSP+ countries to expand their exports
to the EU, especially in those sections with pre-reform import shares close to the graduation
threshold.
We begin by estimating the aggregate impact of the 2014 reform on EU imports from GSP+
countries; then, we attempt to isolate the various aspects of the reform from the impact due to
the removal of the graduation threshold, to assess whether there was a trade effect that can be
attributed to the change in NRTPs uncertainty.
All the models in this paper are estimated exploiting a Poisson-Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood
(PPML) estimator and including observations with zero trade flows in the sample of analysis.
The large number of zero trade flows due to the level of disaggregation of the trade data, as well
as heteroskedasticity issues due to the presence of many small flows, are empirical challenges to
be addressed. The PPML estimator is able to efficiently handle both issues, as shown by (Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006).
4.1 The aggregate impact of the 2014 reform on EU imports from GSP+
countries
We rely on a triple difference-in-difference estimator, following the work of Frazer and Van Biese-
broeck (2010), which exploits the three sources of variation in our data: country eligibility for
13
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GSP+, product eligibility for GSP+ (at the 8-digit level), and the timing of the reform. The im-
pact of the reform is captured by the treated observations, which in our context are EU imports
of GSP+ eligible products, from GSP+ countries, post 2014. The control group includes imports
from GSP+ countries pre-reform, imports of non-GSP+ eligible product from GSP+ countries
post-reform, and all the import flows performed by countries that, over the 2009-2016 period,
were beneficiaries of the standard GSP scheme, either throughout the entire period, or for part
of it.22 We remove from the estimation sample countries that, over the 2009-2016 period, were
not in the GSP scheme, as we cannot compute a GSP import-share and the distance from the
graduation threshold for these countries.23 We decided to remove from the control group also
EBA countries: unlike standard GSP and GSP+ countries, EBA countries were never affected by
preferences uncertainty, their EU imports therefore representing a less adequate counterfactual
for the impact of the reform on GSP+ countries.24
The basic estimating equation is given by:




cs,t ) + γcs,t + δk,t + λcs,k + εk,cs,t (4.1)
where M denotes the value of imports in thousands of Euros, k denotes products at the 8-digit
level, cs denotes country-section pairs and t denotes years. Note that we define the members’
eligibility at the country-section rather than at the country level, in order to be able to assign
correctly the membership status to countries which graduated in some sections, but not in
others. The main regressor of interest is a triple interaction between three binary variables:
GSPplusprodk,t , which takes the value 1 if a product k is eligible for GSP+ in year t and 0
otherwise; GSPplusmembercs,t , which takes the value 1 if a country-section cs is a GSP+ beneficiary
22In the empirical analysis we can easily allow for country exits from the GSP scheme at different points in
time, and for transitions between GSP and GSP+.
23These are the high-income countries, under the World Bank classification. Their inclusion in the regressions
where we do not exploit the distance from the graduation threshold leaves the results unchanged. For this reason,
and to keep the sample consistent throughout the analysis, we preferred to remove these countries from all the
regressions we present in the paper.
24Inclusion of EBA countries in the sample does not alter qualitatively the results.
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in year t and 0 otherwise; reft, which takes the value 1 in years post-reform, i.e. post 2014, and 0
otherwise. This triple interaction term, therefore, takes the value 1 for GSP+ eligible products,
imported from GSP+ countries, post 2014, and its coefficient β1 measures the impact of the
reform. Importantly, we also add three sets of interactive fixed effects: γcs,t denotes a set of
country-section-time fixed effects; δk,t denotes a set of product-time fixed effects; λcs,k denotes
a set of country-section-product fixed effects. The use of these three set of fixed effects implies
that the only variation left in the data to identify β1 comes from country-section-product (cs,k)
specific changes in imports post-reform, relative to their pre-reform average.
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) show that specification (4.1) correctly estimates a triple
difference-in-difference model, without the need to add the three non-interacted binary variables
together with the three double-interaction terms between them, as they are all replaced by the
three sets of interactive fixed effects. These fixed effects are preferable to the double-interactions
because they make specification (4.1) less restrictive, as they allow for heterogeneity in the base
level of EU imports of any country-section-product combination, the base level of EU imports
of any product in any year, and the base level of EU imports from any country-section pair in
any year.25 Other than making the estimating equation more flexible, the three sets of fixed
effects control for a great deal of unobservable confounding factors at the country-section-time,
product-time and country-section-product level.
4.2 Lower uncertainty or better market access?
Over the period under analysis, Pakistan, the Philippines and Kyrgystan were admitted into the
GSP+ for the first time, from the standard GSP. Specification (4.1) correctly deals with changes
in membership over time, due to the time-varying membership variables and the country-section-
time fixed effects. However, the GSP+ treatment is more preferential than the standard GSP,
25A model with the double interactions would be more restrictive, as it would lump all the country-product
combinations in four exclusive groups: GSP+ eligible products from GSP+ countries, GSP+ eligible products
from non-GSP+ countries, and non-GSP+ eligible products from the two group of countries. This would impose
a single base level of imports for each group.
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as all GSP+ eligible products can be imported into the EU duty-free, whereas standard GSP
tariffs do not go to zero for about 50% of the eligible products. This implies that, EU imports
from a country which moves from the standard GSP to the GSP+ at the same time of the reform
could have increased both because of the change in uncertainty about preferences, and because
of better market access granted by the lower tariffs. The contemporaneous effect of the reform
and GSP+ entry affected Pakistan, which entered the GSP+ in 2014, and to a lesser extent the
Philippines and Kyrgyzstan, which entered in 2015 and 2016, respectively.
We disentangle the impact of the change in uncertainty from that of better market access for
countries which switched from standard GSP to GSP+ preferences in two alternative exercises.
The first, simpler, exercise consists in conditioning the impact of the reform on the tariff rate
applied by the EU on imports from standard GSP and GSP+ countries. The tariff rate τcs,k,t is
at the country-section-product-year level, and its impact can be estimated by directly adding it
as a control in specification 4.1.





ηln(τcs,k,t) + γcs,t + δk,t + λcs,k + εk,cs,t (4.2)
Conditional on the applied tariff rate, we still expect β1 to be positive and significant if part of
the trade impact of the reform is due to lower trade policy uncertainty.
The second exercise we perform to disentangle the impact of uncertainty from that of lower
tariffs is as follows. As a measure of market access in the EU, for each country-section-product
triplet we calculate preference margins, as the difference between MFN and GSP tariffs. We
then construct two binary variables which separate the country-section-product triplets whose
preference margin changed in 2014, from those triplets whose preference margins did not change
in the reform year.26 GSPplusprod,∆pref=0cs,k , which takes value 1 if the preference margin of a
26For the country-section-product triplets belonging to the Philippines and Kyrgyzstan we exploit their year
of entry into the GSP+ in the construction of these variables.
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product k imported from country-section cs did not change in the year of the reform, and 0
otherwise; GSPplusprod,∆pref≠0cs,k which takes value 1 if the preference margin of a product k
imported from country-section cs changed in the year of the reform, and 0 otherwise. We then
use these binary variables to construct two triple interaction terms and augment specification
4.1 in the following way:










γcs,t + δk,t + λcs,k + εk,cs,t (4.3)
Specification (4.3) separates the impact of the reform on 2 sub-groups of observations. β1
identifies the impact of reform on products for which there was no change in market access to
the EU such that, if an effect is found, this must be due to the change in NRTPs uncertainty
only. β2, instead, identifies the impact of the reform on products which, other than a change in
uncertainty, also benefited from better preferences in the EU: this coefficient, therefore, picks
up the joint effect of lower uncertainty and better market access. We expect both β1 and β2
to be positive and significant, but due to the combined impact of lower uncertainty and better
preferences, we expect β2 to be larger than β1.
4.3 The threshold effect
The change in NRTPs uncertainty in the 2014 GSP reform is of a particular kind: it came from
removing the import-share threshold which determined competitiveness related graduations for
GSP+ countries. Country-section pairs with a low import-share might not have responded at
all to the 2014 reform, as their export activity was not constrained by the threshold. The
threshold removal should instead have affected country-section pairs with large import-shares:
their vicinity to the threshold conferred uncertainty about their GSP+ preferences, as an increase
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of their exports, or a decrease of another country’s exports, could have determined an increase
in the import-share and the loss of duty free access to the EU. This uncertainty could have
deterred investments in GSP+ eligible products and therefore constrained the growth of export
activity. So, if the 2014 reform caused an increase in EU imports from GSP+ countries, and
this effect was due to a reduction in uncertainty, we should find that the increase in trade was
strongest for country-sections closest to the graduation threshold.
To unpack the aggregate effect of the reform across country-section pairs which experienced
NRTPs uncertainty of varying intensity, we compute the distance from the graduation threshold
as the ratio between each country-sections’ import-share and the threshold imposed by the EU.
In doing so, we consider the timing of the reform and the novelties it introduced. The reform
was announced in 2012 (European Union, 2012), and applied in 2014. Further, the EU computes
graduation import-shares at three year intervals, by exploiting the import data for the preceding
three years; e.g. the graduations applied over the 2014-2016 period were determined with import-
shares computed in 2012 with data for 2009-2011.27 Now it can safely be assumed that during
the 2009-11 period, GSP+ countries were exporting to the EU without having knowledge of the
changes that the 2014 was going to introduce28 and therefore must have informed their exporting
decisions under NRTPs uncertainty, whose intensity was given by their expected import-share
computed according to the pre-reform rules.
Recall that pre-2014 reform import-shares were computed out of a larger membership and
out of 21 sections, while post-reform import shares are computed out of smaller membership and
out of 32 sections. Since import-share calculation rules and thresholds introduced by the 2014
reform never applied to GSP+ countries, we consider the pre-reform setting (i.e. membership,
27The calculation implies computing yearly import-shares for each country-section pair, then taking a three
year average over the relevant period.
28The EU organized a public consultation in 2011 about which aspects of its GSP were more problematic,
but the actual regulation announcing the reform was only published on the Official Journal of the EU at the end
of 2012. Furthermore, since the EU GSP scheme was going to expire at the end of 2013, GSP+ countries had
to re-apply for this more preferential status to be maintained from 2014 onwards. The EU opened the GSP+
applications only after publishing the 2012 reform, and announced the decision about which countries were granted
GSP+ status in August 2013 (European Union, 2014)
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sections and thresholds) as the relevant one for the uncertainty that could have affected GSP+
countries’ trade. For these reasons, we compute country-section import-shares applying the pre-
reform rules, using 2009-2011 import data29, and the pre-reform graduation thresholds (15%;
12.5% for textiles).
Inspection of the pre-reform import-shares and their distance from the threshold, however,
reveals a very skewed distance distribution: the majority of the treated observations (the imports
of GSP+ products from GSP+ countries post-reform) belong to country-sections with very low
import shares.30 This induced us to estimate the impact of NRTPs uncertainty removal by
exploiting two mutually exclusive binary variables, rather than using a continuous distance
measure. For this purpose we separate the country-sections pairs (and their relative product
level import flows) in the two following categories: GSPplusmember,7.5ppcs,t for import-shares within
7.5 percentage points from the threshold, and GSPplusmember,>7.5ppcs,t for import-shares more than
7.5 percentage points away from the threshold. We then construct two triple interaction terms
to estimate the impact of the reform for each of these import-shares categories:










ηln(τk,cs,t) + γcs,t + δk,t + λcs,k + εk,cs,t (4.4)
Specification (4.4) separates the impact of the reform on the observations which, due to their
vicinity to the threshold, were exposed to NRTPs uncertainty pre-reform, from the impact on
other observations for which NRTPs uncertainty was less of a concern. We therefore expect, if
29We believe that GSP+ countries were operating under uncertainty during the 2009-11 period, and that the
most up-to-date information about their distance from the graduation threshold was given by their EU imports
in those years. As a robustness check, we also computed import-shares with 2004-2006 import data, i.e. data for
the years that determined the 2008 round of graduations and that were known with certainty by GSP+ countries
during the pre-reform period that we exploit in estimation (2009-2013). Results are upheld if these alternative
import-shares are used to calculate the distance from the threshold.
30Table 8 in the Appendix reports the top 10 import-shares in our sample together with the first largest 15
import-shares of GSP+ countries.
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the 2014 reform affected EU imports of GSP+ countries through lower uncertainty, β1 to be
positive and significant, and β2 to be smaller and/or less statistically significant.
4.4 Disentangling the change in uncertainty from the change in GSP mem-
bership
In the 2014 GSP reform the EU attempted to make the preferences offered to developing countries
both more predictable, hence the removal of the graduation threshold, and more meaningful.
This second aspect was addressed by restricting preferential market access to the EU to the
countries most in need, to give them a competitive advantage over the countries that were
excluded from the GSP. The EU, in fact, halved the scheme membership, graduating all upper-
middle income countries, countries with alternative preferential trade agreements with the EU
and the overseas territories under control of EU countries. The large change in the number
of GSP beneficiaries could have implied a change in competition in the EU market in favour
of the countries remaining in the scheme, which in turn could have stimulated their exports
to the EU. GSP+ countries, therefore, could have been exposed to a ”double treatment”, as
they benefited from the removal of uncertainty concerning their preferences, and from a more
favourable competitive position, relative to countries that were excluded from the scheme.
To reduce concerns that the estimated trade effect for GSP+ countries was mostly due to
a more favourable competitive position, rather than the reduction of NRTPs uncertainty, we
exclude from the estimation sample the GSP sections where the change in competition could
have been substantial. For each section, we calculate the pre-reform share of EU GSP imports
for countries that remained in the GSP (stayers) and for countries that were excluded from the
GSP (exiters). We then re-assess the impact of the reform estimating specifications 4.1-4.4 on
the subsample of GSP sections in which stayers’ share of EU GSP imports pre-reform exceeded
75%. This implies a reduction in the number of GSP sections in estimation from 32 to 13, and,
if results are upheld, should confirm that the bulk of the trade impact of the 2014 GSP reform
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came through the removal of NRTPs uncertainty.31
4.5 Data
For the empirical analysis we match and exploit three different data sources. Detailed trade
data on EU imports from all partner countries worldwide, at the CN-8 digit product level and
at annual frequency, was extracted from COMEXT for the 2009-2016 period. These data contain
information on the value imported in Euro, the trade regime applicable to the import flow (MFN,
GSP or other preferential tariff), and the trade regime used when the product is imported in the
EU. We deal with annual changes in the CN classification by exploiting the concording routine
of Van Beveren et al. (2012).32
Second, information on tariff rates applied by the EU to all products from all trade part-
ners, including data on GSP, GSP+ and EBA eligible products, was taken from the UNCTAD
TRAINS dataset through WITS. We use both preferential and MFN tariff schedules, respec-
tively, which allows us to compute preferential tariff margins as the difference between the MFN
tariff and corresponding preferential rate.33
Thirdly, we also require data on beneficiaries’ membership in the EU’s GSP programme as
well as information on country- and country-section-specific graduation episodes that affected
GSP beneficiaries over time. This information was retrieved directly from EU regulations as
published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
31For robustness, we also exploit an even more stringent subsample, estimating the effect of the reform on
sectors where GSP stayers accounted for at least 88.5% of EU GSP imports pre-reform (thereby using only 6 GSP
sections in estimation).
32This routine creates a synthetic CN code for those products whose classification has changed over time and
allows to concord data at flexible intervals (i.e. from any time period to any time period), as long as the CN
concordance tables and the yearly CN classifications are available.
33The tariff line data in TRAINS were exported at the finest level available (12-digit) and aggregated to the
8-digit level as simple averages, in preparation for merging this information to trade data.
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5 Results
This section presents the results from estimating the empirical models described in section (4).
All models are estimated with a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator using
the routine that Correia et al. have developed for PPML settings with high dimensional fixed
effects Correia et al. (2019). Standard errors are clustered at the country-product level, following
Thelle et al. (2015).
5.1 Impact of the 2014 reform
Table 4 presents the results from estimating specifications (4.1)-(4.3). Column 1 shows the
aggregate impact of the reform, obtained estimating specification (4.1): on average, the 2014
reform induced an increase in EU imports of GSP+ products from GSP+ countries by 47%.34
Table 4: Impact of 2014 GSP reform on EU imports from GSP+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample All Stayers’ import-share >75%.
GSPplus 0.389*** 0.374*** 0.338*** 0.318***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.105) (0.106)
Ln(1+tariff) -1.801*** -1.736*** -3.300*** -3.174***
(0.429) (0.427) (0.807) (0.815)
GSPplus - ∆pref = 0 0.310*** 0.302*** 0.292*** 0.282**
(0.105) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113)
GSPplus - ∆pref ≠ 0 0.672*** 0.630*** 0.547*** 0.491***
(0.113) (0.112) (0.123) (0.126)
Country-section-year FE y y y y y y y y
Product-year FE y y y y y y y y
Country-section-product FE y y y y y y y y
N 1947436 1947436 1947436 1947436 1348885 1348885 1348885 1348885
Note: Standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
This impact is statistically robust, and economically sizeable. It must be considered, how-
ever, that the coefficient in column 1 captures the average effect across all GSP+ eligible products
exported by GSP+ members: this is, no distinction is made across products more or less exposed
to NRTPs uncertainty (i.e. their vicinity to the graduation threshold). Further, since GSP+ en-
34This is the marginal effect computed as eβ − 1 as the dependent variable is the value of EU imports.
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trants are included in the treated sub-sample, both the effect of the uncertainty removal and
better market access in the EU are embedded in the coefficient in column 1.
Column 2 reports the estimates obtained from specification (4.2), by which we begin to
disentangle the impact of lower preferences uncertainty from that of lower tariffs applied on
products exported by GSP+ entrants. The tariff rate exhibits an elasticity of -1.8. Importantly,
there is still a positive impact of the reform on EU imports over and above the effect of changes
in tariffs: as expected, the reform coefficient is somewhat smaller with respect to that in column
1, but still shows an increase in EU imports of approximately 45% since the the 2014 GSP
reform.
Columns 3 presents the estimates obtained from specification (4.3), which separates the
impact of the reform across country-section-product triplets which, in 201435, experienced a
change in preferences margins from those triplets whose preference margins did not change. The
coefficients in column 3 are positive and significant for both subgroups, with magnitudes in
line with expectations: the reform induced a larger increase in imports for products which, in
addition to the uncertainty removal, benefited also from lower tariffs (95%), than for products
whose tariffs did not change (35%). This latter coefficient can be considered a lower bound
estimate of the impact of NRTPs uncertainty removal.
Finally, in columns (4)-(8) we show that the main effect of the 2014 reform is reduced
only marginally when we attempt to disentangle the impact of lower NRTPs uncertainty from
that of a more favourable competitive position for GSP+ countries in the EU. We re-estimate
specifications (4.1)-(4.3) on the reduced sub-sample obtained by retaining only GSP sections with
a large pre-reform import-share by stayers. All the estimates retain their statistical significance
and magnitude despite the lower sample size, thereby reassuring that lower NRTPs uncertainty
had a sizeable effect on EU imports from GSP+ countries post reform.
35For the Philippines and Kyrgyzstan we used their year of GSP+ entry to identify products with or without
changes in preference margins
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5.2 Is there a threshold effect?
The results in Table 4 show that the GSP reform of 2014 affected EU imports from GSP+
countries positively. However, the trade effect of the reform, if due to the removal of uncertainty,
should appear more strongly for country-section pairs close to the graduation threshold pre-
reform. To explore this rationale we estimate specification (4.4), which unpacks the average
effects reported in Table 4 over two subgroups of observations at different distances from the
threshold. These results are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 shows the existence of a threshold effect, as removing the graduation threshold
impacted EU imports from GSP+ country-sections close the threshold more strongly. The
estimated increase in trade post-reform for products in country-sections in the first of the two
sub-groups is appreciably higher than that for products in the second subgroup, with the effects
being 81% and 47%, respectively. Adding the applied tariff as a control variable, to condition
on changes in trade due to better market access for some of the products exported by GSP+
entrants, reduces somewhat the coefficients on both the subgroups, as expected, but both retain
their statistical significance.
Table 5: Impact of 2014 reform: relevance of distance from graduation threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Stayers’ import-share >75%.
GSPplus - Close (dist. <7.5pp) 0.594*** 0.539*** 0.570*** 0.469**
(0.191) (0.193) (0.193) (0.198)
GSPplus - Not close (dist. >7.5pp) 0.385*** 0.370*** 0.331*** 0.314***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.108) (0.108)
Ln(1+tariff) -1.799*** -3.288***
(0.429) (0.808)
Country-section-year FE y y y y
Product-year FE y y y y
Country-section-product FE y y y y
N 1947436 1947436 1348885 1348885
Note: Standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses, * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Similarly to Table 4, also in Table 5 we show that the estimated effects are completely robust
to excluding from the estimation sample GSP sections where the change in GSP membership
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could have resulted in a sizeable competitive advantage for GSP+ countries over the countries
that left the GSP. In column 4, importantly, we show that also on the reduced sub-sample, and
when controlling for the applied tariff rate, the subgroup of products in country-sections close
to the threshold saw an increase in trade of 60% relative to the pre-reform period, as opposed
to the 36% increase in trade for products in the second subgroup.
The large coefficient estimated on the subgroup of products not close to the graduation
threshold, and its similarity to the aggregate impact of the reform (Table 4), is due to the
very uneven distribution of country-section import-shares across the two subgroups: out of
16,552 treated observations, 1227 belong to country-sections within 7.5 percentage points of the
threshold, and 15,325 belong to country-sections more than 7.5 percentage points away from the
threshold. Nonetheless, the findings in Table 5 can be taken as further indication of the fact that
the 2014 reform impacted trade of GSP+ countries through a reduction in uncertainty about
their trade preferences, as removing the graduation threshold affected those exporters most at
risk of losing preferential access to the EU twice as strongly.
6 Trade re-direction or an increase in exporting activity?
The empirical analysis of the impact of the 2014 reform revealed an increase of EU imports from
GSP+ countries. What did this change in behaviour of exporters in GSP+ countries consist
of? Did GSP+ exporters take advantage of the lower uncertainty by increasing their exporting
activity, or was their trade re-directed from other export destinations, which, post-reform in the
EU, offered less favourable conditions?
Exploring the factors underlying the increase in EU imports is relevant for policy making: it
would not be desirable to offer more certain trade preferences, if in response developing countries
simply shifted their exports from other destinations to the market where preferences uncertainty
fell. If, on the other side, removing uncertainty led to more exporting activity, through more firm
entry or an increased amount exported by incumbents, then the effects of the policy intervention
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are much more worthwhile, and in line with the primary objective of a GSP scheme.
In this section we investigate whether the increase in EU imports from GSP+ countries
was matched by a decrease in their exports to other destinations. To do so, we adopt the same
empirical strategy that we exploited to identify the impact of the 2014 GSP reform, but instead
of the effect on EU imports, we estimate the impact of the reform on the Rest of the World’s
(ROW) imports from GSP+ countries.
We extract data on ROW imports, from 2009 to 2016 and at the HS 6-digit level, from
COMTRADE. The ROW is defined as the total amount of imports by all countries in the
World, minus imports reported by the EU countries.
A difficulty arises when resorting to COMTRADE data, however. A 6-digit product, the
finest level of disaggregation available in COMTRADE, might contain both eligible and non-
eligible GSP+ products, as GSP+ eligibility is defined at the 8-digit product level. Furthermore,
both the structure of the HS classification in terms of 8-digit product lines within 6-digit cat-
egories, as well as the number of 8-digit GSP eligible products within 6-digit categories, are
rather arbitrary and vary substantially across the various chapters of the HS classification. This
makes it difficult to meaningfully aggregate the 8-digit GSP eligibily information to the 6-digit
level.
To obviate the problem of identifying GSP products in the COMTRADE data, we construct
two alternative binary GSP+ product identifiers at the 6-digit level: GSPplusprod,6 dig,ONEk,t ,
taking value 1 if at least one of the 8-digit products within the 6-digit group is eligible for
GSP+, and 0 otherwise; GSPplusprod,6 dig,ALLk,t , taking value 1 if all the 8-digit products within
the 6-digit group are eligible for GSP+, and 0 otherwise. These two indicators are, respectively,
the loosest and the strictest way of reporting GSP eligibility from the 8- to the 6-digit level.
Using GSPplusprod,6 dig,ONEk,t implies that some of the products non-eligible for GSP+ non-
eligible which fall in ”mixed” 6-digit groups are going to be considered as treated by the reform;
using GSPplusprod,6 dig,ALLk,t implies that some GSP+ eligible products treated by the reform
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are going to fall in the control group. As neither or the two alternatives is clearly preferable to
the other, we experiment with both indicators.
We perfom two empirical exercises: first, we verify the robustness of the main results on
EU imports, when the data are aggregated at the 6-digit level. Then, we re-estimate the main
model by replacing EU imports with ROW imports on the left-hand-side, to assess whether
GSP+ countries re-directed their trade from the ROW to the EU to take advantage of more
secure trade preferences.
Table 6 shows the results from estimating specification (4.1) on the data aggregated at
the 6-digit level: when exploiting the looser GSPplusprod,6 dig,ONEk,t identifier, the impact of the
reform estimated with EU data is fully confirmed. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect
is very close to that obtained with the 8-digit product identifier, signalling that the distortion
introduced by this variable is not substantial. When the stricter GSPplusprod,6 dig,ALLk,t indi-
cator is exploited, results are instead rather different: the impact of the reform appears to be
halved, with its statistical significance reduced to approximately 15%. This suggest that the
GSPplusprod,6 dig,ONEk,t is the preferable 6-digit GSP+ eligibility indicator. Overall, these results
reassure that the aggregation from 8- to 6-digit still allows for the detection of a sizeable impact
of the reform on EU imports.
Table 6: Trade re-direction from the EU to the ROW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU imports ROW imports
GSP+ (6-d one) 0.333*** 0.117*
(0.085) (0.070)
GSP+ (6-d all) 0.140 0.0332
(0.087) (0.066)
Country-section-year FE y y y y
Product-year FE y y y y
Country-section-product FE y y y y
N 1414113 1414113 1319078 1319078
Note: Standard errors clustered at country-section level in parentheses,’ p <0.15 * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01
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More importantly, however, the increase in trade between the EU and GSP+ countries is
not matched by a decrease in ROW imports: exploiting the (preferable) GSPplusprod,6 dig,ONEk,t
variable, the reform appears to have had a positive impact on ROW imports, suggesting the
existence of a positive spillover effect on exports to the ROW. The positive impact on ROW
imports in not strongly significant, but it strengthens the importance of the results obtained for
EU imports, as it appears that GSP+ exporters did not simply re-direct their shipments from
the ROW to the EU to take advantage of better preferential market access.
7 Conclusion
Non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) are granted unilaterally by advanced economies to
developing countries to increase their trade and support economic development. Yet their effec-
tiveness might be undermined by the significant degree of uncertainty surrounding the stability
of preferential market access over time.
This paper is the first work that empirically investigates the effect of removing uncertainty
regarding NTPRs on developing countries’ trade by exploiting the context of the 2014 reform
of the EU GSP scheme. The reform eliminated the possibility of preference withdrawal from
GSP+ countries, a subset of EU GSP members, in case their competitiveness grows beyond the
limits established by the graduation mechanism. Specifically, the threat of preference removal
in specific sectors (i.e. country-section graduation) due to a country’s share of EU imports in
that sector exceeding a certain threshold, does not apply any longer to GSP+ countries since
the reform.
The 2014 reform increased EU imports of GSP+ products from GSP+ countries by 45%
on average. We provide evidence that the reform reduced uncertainty about NRTPs, with the
latter having an independent effect on EU imports of GSP+ countries, over and above the effect
of other aspects of the GSP reform.
We adopt two strategies for isolating the effect of the uncertainty removal from that of better
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market access obtained by countries that moved from the standard GSP to the GSP+ around
the time of the reform. We condition our empirical results on the tariff applied by the EU on
imports from GSP+ countries and, alternatively, we estimate the impact of the reform separately
on imports of GSP+ products which did not benefit from changes in preference margins in the
reform. Within the subsample of observations for which the preference margin did not change,
EU imports increased by 35%, which is solely attributable to lower preferences uncertainty.
Lower NRTPs uncertainty arising from the removal of the graduation threshold should have
affected mostly country-section pairs at risk of graduating, i.e. with import-shares close to the
threshold. Accordingly, we find that the reform increased EU imports of products in sectors
with higher import-shares by more. In particular, imports from sections closer to the graduation
threshold (within 7.5 percentage points from it) increased by 71%, or nearly twice as much as
imports from sections further away from it.
Finally, we also show that the increase in EU imports from GSP+ countries due to the
reform is not matched by a decrease in GSP+ countries’ exports to alternative destinations.
The reform appears to not have triggered the re-direction of trade from the rest of the world to
the EU, in order to take advantage of more secure preferential market access.
Given how GSP+ countries benefited from the 2014 reform, one might wonder whether
similar gains could potentially be reaped by economies in the standard GSP scheme, for which
preference uncertainty continues to prevail. As an illustrative example, Figure 1 shows the
import shares of the four largest Indian sectors over the period preceding the 2014 EU GSP
reform36.
The import shares grew over time but seem to be hovering just below the 15% threshold,
which would have triggered the loss of preferential access to the EU. India is a standard GSP
beneficiary and as such was not affected by the reform that we describe in this paper. Yet
in light of our empirical results obtained for GSP+ countries, India and other standard GSP
36For this graph we chose to focus on India as this country is currently the largest GSP beneficiary, and
therefore features the largest number of sectors close to the graduation threshold
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Figure 1: EU import-shares from India by top sectors, 2004-2013
Source: Authors’ elaboration on COMEXT data.
beneficiaries could potentially benefit a great deal from uncertainty removal.
Our findings demonstrate that trade policy uncertainty adversely affects trade flows to a
significant and quantitatively important extent. For exporters in developing countries to take
full advantage of the benefits offered by non-reciprocal preference schemes, there needs to be a
sufficiently high degree of stability in trading conditions. Based upon our results, we conjec-
ture that beneficiary countries would benefit from further reform that eliminated discretionary
elements from GSP schemes. Beyond trade preferences, there is a wide range of situations in
which commitment (or the lack thereof) matters for economic outcomes, and so the insights
gained from this policy reform may be informative in other contexts as well, e.g. for foreign
direct investment.
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8 Appendix
Table 7: List of GSP members
Standard GSP GSP+ EBA
Congo Armenia Afghanistan Madagascar
Cook Islands Bolivia Angola Malawi
India Cabo Verde Bangladesh Mali
Indonesia Kyrgyz Republic Benin Mauritania
Kenya Mongolia Bhutan Mozambique
Micronesia Pakistan Burkina Faso Myanmar
Nauru Philippines Burundi Nepal
Nigeria Sri Lanka Cambodia Niger
Niue Central African Rep. Rwanda
Samoa Chad Sao Tome and Principe
Syria Comoros Senegal
Tajikistan Congo (Dem. Rep.) Sierra Leone
Tonga Djibouti Solomon Islands
Uzbekistan Equatorial Guinea Somalia










Note: Autors’ elaboration on EU GSP regulations.
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Table 8: Country-section import-shares pre 2014 GSP reform
Rank Member Import-share GSP type HS Section Section description
1 Russia 0.1448 Std. GSP IX Wood, charcoal, cork and articles thereof
2 India 0.1431 Std. GSP XIV Pearls and precious metals
3 Mexico 0.1423 Std. GSP XVII Vehicles, aircraft and vessels
4 India 0.1414 Std. GSP XVII Vehicles, aircraft and vessels
5 Vietnam 0.1335 Std. GSP XII Footwear, headger and umbrellas
6 India 0.1279 Std. GSP VIII Leather, raw hides and skins
7 Brazil 0.1224 Std. GSP XVII Vehicles, aircraft and vessels
8 Kuwait 0.1201 Std. GSP V Mineral products
9 Brazil 0.1183 Std. GSP IX Wood, charcoal, cork and articles thereof
10 Bangladesh 0.1145 EBA XIb Apparel and clothing
18 Pakistan 0.0974 GSP+ XIa Textiles
39 Philippines 0.0641 GSP+ III Animal and vegetable fats and oils
71 Pakistan 0.0385 GSP+ VIII Leather, raw hides and skins
80 Pakistan 0.0342 GSP+ XIb Apparel and clothing
82 Philippines 0.0334 GSP+ XVIII Optical, measuring and medical instruments
149 Philippines 0.0181 GSP+ IV Prepared foodstuffs
192 Philippines 0.0126 GSP+ XIV Pearls and precious metals
241 Pakistan 0.0085 GSP+ XX Woks of art and antiques
279 Pakistan 0.0063 GSP+ II Vegetable products
284 Philippines 0.0059 GSP+ XVI Machinery and mechanical appliances
288 Philippines 0.0058 GSP+ VII Plastics and articles thereof
321 Philippines 0.0048 GSP+ XVII Vehicles, aircraft and vessels
328 Pakistan 0.0046 GSP+ VII Plastics and articles thereof
337 Armenia 0.0044 GSP+ XV Base metals and articles thereof
Note: Autors’ elaboration on COMEXT data.
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Table 9: International Conventions by NTPO area in EU’s GSP+
Human rights
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Economic, social and cultural rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No. 29
Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No. 87
Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively,
No. 98
Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No. 100
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No. 105
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No. 111
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No. 138
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No. 182
Environmental protection
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
Convention on Biological Diversity
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Public health
UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Corruption
UN Convention against Corruption
Note: Author’s elaboration on EU regulation.
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